Bilingual News - 中国经济的硬着陆风险Risks of a Hard Landing for China

 

[Photo: news.takungpao.com]

中 国新一届领导层正试图完成一项难度极大的经济调整，即让中国飞速发展的经济放慢前进的脚步。近来，随着有关部门采取措施试图对“影子银行业”加以控制，种 种困难就表现得更为明显。但在这些困难背后却隐藏着一个更大的问题：中国日益放缓的经济甚至有可能崩盘。实际上，正是中国新一届政府所表达出来的打算依赖 市场机制来实现发展的愿望引发了这种风险。

 

The new Chinese leadership is trying to manage one of the most difficult of economic manoeuvres: slowing down a flying economy. Recently, difficulties have become more apparent, with the attempt of the authorities to bring “shadow banking” under control. Yet this is part of a bigger picture: the risk that a slowing economy might even crash. Indeed, the expressed desire of China’s new government to rely on market mechanisms raises the risks.

 

在最近的一篇报告中，杰罗姆列维预报中心(Jerome Levy Forecasting Center)的大卫?列维(David Levy)提出了一个关键问题：中国的“失速速度”是多少？人们普遍认为，中国在未来十年里可轻而易举地将经济增速从10%降至比如说6%。 这里隐含的假设是，“一个迅速扩张的经济体就像一列高速行驶的火车；松开油门，它自然就慢下来了。它会继续沿着之前所在的轨道行驶，只不过速度没有那么快 了。”列维却认为，中国更像是一架大型喷气式客机：“最近几年，有两个引擎一直运转得不太正常，飞行员现在不愿继续把压力都压在剩下的好引擎上。他开始让 飞机减速，但如果减得太厉害，飞行速度就将低于失速速度，飞机就会从天上掉下来。”

 

In a recent note, David Levy of the Jerome Levy Forecasting Center has asked the crucial question: what is China’s stall speed? The general view is that it is straightforward for China to move from 10 per cent to, say, 6 per cent growth over the coming decade. The implicit assumption is that “a rapidly expanding economy is like a speeding train; let up on the throttle and it slows down. It continues to roll along the track as before, just not as rapidly.” He argues, instead, that China is more like a jumbo jet: “In recent years, a couple of engines have not been working well, and the pilot is now loath to keep straining the remaining good engines. He is allowing the plane to slow down, but if it slows too much, it will fall below stall speed and drop out of the sky.” 

 

2008年后，净出口不再是中国经济的一支推动力量。投资填补了这个空档，特别是在2009年。其结果是，投资支出占中国国内生产总值(GDP)的比重进一步飙升——2007年时为42%，这已然是一个高得出奇的数字，2010年时升至48%，这更是绝对令人瞠目结舌。驱动这一投资引擎的“飞机燃油”，是信贷的爆炸性增长；2009年，贷款年增速接近30%。这一政策当时获得了极大的成功。但如今，在净出口热潮已经退去的情况下，中国政府还希望降低对信贷所驱动的投资的依赖，那么，中国经济现在只剩下一个引擎，那就是消费——私人消费和公共消费。

 

Thus, after 2008, net exports ceased to be a driving force for the economy. Investment took up the slack, particularly in 2009. That led to a further jump in the share of spending on investment in gross domestic product, from an already extraordinarily high 42 per cent in 2007 to an absolutely amazing 48 per cent in 2010. The jet fuel driving this investment engine was an explosive growth of credit: loans rose at an annual rate of close to 30 per cent during 2009. The policy was highly successful. But, with booming net exports a thing of the past, the Chinese authorities now also wish to reduce the reliance on credit-fuelled investment. The engine that the Chinese economy now has left is consumption, private and public.

 

实际上，有关各引擎对GDP增长的贡献的季度数据显示，迄今为止，中国政府所希望的放缓进展得非常顺利（见图表）。但它若想将经济增速从10%降至6%，仍需克服巨大的挑战。

 

In fact, figures for quarterly contributions to the growth of demand suggest that the desired slowdown has gone impressively smoothly, so far (see charts). But the challenges of a move from growth of 10 per cent to 6 remain huge.

 

首先，库存投资必须大幅下降，原因是库存投资水平取决于经济增速、而非经济活动水平。想想看：在一个增长停滞的经济体中，库存积累通常为零。再者，假设其他因素保持不变，如果经济增速降至6%，那么所需的库存投资将会变为经济增速为10%时所需库存投资的60%。这一调整造成的即刻影响将是，库存投资大幅下滑，而后才会从已经降下来的水平（对应的经济增速为6%）上重新开始增长。另外，企业很可能无法完全预见到经济的放缓，尤其是在经历了多年的高得多的经济增长之后。因此，它们会发现自己受累于迅速增加的库存，不得不大幅削减存货，并以更大的幅度削减产出。

 

 First, investment in inventories must fall sharply, since its level depends on the growth of an economy, not on the level of activity. Think about it: in a stagnant economy, inventory accumulation would normally be zero. Again, other things equal, an economy growing at 6 per cent would need 60 per cent of the investment in inventories of one growing at 10 per cent. The immediate impact of this adjustment would be a sharp decline in investment in inventories, before their growth resumed at 6 per cent a year, from the now lower level. Moreover, businesses might well fail to anticipate the economy’s slowdown altogether, particularly after years of far higher economic growth. They would then find themselves burdened with rapidly rising inventories and would then be obliged to slash inventories and so levels of output even further.

 

其次，固定资本投资也必须大幅下降。投资或许不得不下降40%：在其他因素不变的情况下，这意味着中国的GDP要收缩20%，那显然需要一场深度（而意外的）衰退。那些负责投资的人很可能不能迅速做出调整，因为他们预期中国经济会再次以10%的速度增长。那种增长会暂时对中国经济形成支撑，但付出的代价却是产能过剩严重加剧。和库存的情况一样，届时将会导致更大幅度的投资下降。

 

Second, investment in fixed capital must also fall sharply. Investment might have to fall by 40 per cent: all other things equal, in China that would imply a 20 per cent decline in GDP, which would evidently entail a deep (and unexpected) recession. Those responsible for investment might well fail to adjust quickly, because they expected the 10 per cent annual rate of growth to return. That would support the economy for a while, but at the expense of soaring excess capacity. As in the case of inventories, that would then cause a still bigger investment fall.

 

 第三，投资引发的需求下降和经济活动萎缩还可能对企业利润造成巨大的不利影响。这将损害企业的偿付能力，并进一步降低投资。

 

Third, an investment-induced reduction in demand and activity is also likely to have a large downward impact on profits. That would impair corporate solvency and lower investment still further.

 

最后，经济增速下降、尤其是在巨大的信贷热潮之后出现的增速下降，可能会对资产负债状况产生意外的负面影响。中国私人部门的负债已然相对较高（见图表）。假如经济仍以10%的年增速增长，这些债务应该是可控的。在一个充满活力的经济体中，无所谓选择什么时机出台新项目。但在一个增长更为缓慢的经济体中，坏账可能会出现激增。

 

Finally, a decline in the rate of economic growth, particularly one preceded by a very large credit boom, might have unexpectedly grim effects on the state of balance sheets. China’s private sector is already relatively highly indebted (see chart). Such debt should be manageable, provided the economy continues to grow at 10 per cent a year. In such a dynamic economy, the timing of new projects hardly matters. But, in a more slowly growing economy, the jump in bad debts might prove huge.

 

世界银行(World Bank)在最新一期《全球经济展望》(Global Economic Prospects)中 主张，“（中国的）首要任务仍是继续推动经济走向再平衡，同时采取措施逐步降低不可持续的高投资率”。然而，“如果事实证明投资不能带来盈利，现有贷款的 偿还就可能出现问题——这有可能导致不良贷款激增”。即便中国政府出手纾困金融业，那些负责放贷的人也肯定会变得更加谨慎。似乎可以肯定的是，表外金融的 扩张（中国有关部门最近就此采取了应对措施）会让局面变得更加难以管控。

 

The World Bank’s latest Global Economic Prospects argues that “ongoing rebalancing efforts remain a priority as does engineering a gradual decline in its unsustainably high investment rate.” But, “should investments prove unprofitable, the servicing of existing loans could become problematic – potentially sparking a sharp uptick in non-performing loans”. Even if the government rescued the financial sector, those responsible for lending would surely become more cautious. The growth of off-balance-sheet finance, to which the authorities have recently reacted, seems certain to make this even harder to manage.

 

这一切并不是在说，中国无法在中长期内延续其补偿性增长。相反，这一切说的是，一个增速为6%的经济体的结构，必然会与一个增速为10%的经济体的结构有很大不同。千万不要认为这种调整无需改变GDP各成分的占比。相反，调整后的经济或许是，消费会占GDP的比如说65%，而投资仅占35%。因此，消费增速将不得不大幅高于GDP增速，同时投资增长将会缓慢得多。这将改变收入的分配：家庭可支配收入在GDP中的占比会大幅上升，而企业利润的占比会下降。它还要求改变生产结构，服务业会相对较快地增长，而制造业会相对较慢地增长。

 

None of this is to argue that China cannot continue its catch-up growth, in the medium to longer term. The point is, instead, that the structure of an economy growing at 6 per cent will, inevitably, be quite different from that of one growing at 10 per cent. One must not think of such an adjustment as proportional. On the contrary, the economy that would emerge might have consumption at, say, 65 per cent of GDP and investment at just 35 per cent. So consumption would have to grow substantially faster than GDP, while investment would grow far more slowly. This would mean a different distribution of income: substantially higher shares of household disposable incomes and lower shares of profits in GDP. It would also necessitate a different structure of production, with relatively fast growth of services and relatively slow growth of manufacturing.

 

中 国新一届政府现在从事的工作，实际上是重新设计其“大型喷气式客机”，因为当这架飞机着陆时会有半数引擎运转不正常。市场基本不可能帮助顺利实现如此巨大 的改变。我认为，相信中国会如预期那样着陆的唯一理由是，中国政府在过去解决了大量棘手问题。但眼下这个问题会非常棘手。为了维系需求，中国政府或许会发 现自己不得不去做一些新一届领导层既不想做、而且现在也没预料到会去做的事情，比如累积巨额财政赤字。早点明白这一点至少可以早做准备。

 

The new Chinese government is, in effect, now engaged in the task of redesigning their jumbo jet, as it comes into land, with half of the engines working poorly. The market is most unlikely to deliver such a huge change smoothly. The sole reason I find to trust the landing will work as hoped is that the authorities have handled so many arduous tasks in the past. But it is going to be very tricky. In order to sustain demand, the government might find itself compelled to do some things – run very large fiscal deficits, for example, – that its new leaders neither want nor now expect. At least, forewarned is forearmed.